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WHAT U.S. POLICY WILL BEST ASSURE STABILITY IN EUROPE?

IN making critical choices between a great-power directorate and a world organization, and between the formation of a world organization now, while the war is still on, or at some indefinite post-war date, the United States must also make daily decisions concerning current developments abroad, most immediately in Europe. Much as some people might want to postpone settlement of political problems until after the war, the war itself forces consideration of many controversial issues.

It may be said, without unfairness, that before 1939 this country's policy toward Europe was essentially negative in character. Many Americans had important economic or intellectual ties with the continent, but politically Europe was an area where the United States occasionally intervened to prevent certain things from happening, rather than an area where it had positive interests and pursued clearly defined aims. This negativism had the curious result that while much sympathy was expressed by the American people for the Spanish Loyalists and Czechoslovakia, for example, the American government seemed indifferent to the fate of democratic institutions in Europe.

SPHERES OF INFLUENCE IN EUROPE? Today the United States is forced, in its own self-interest, to act in Europe—and it must act, not alone, but in collaboration with Britain and Russia, both of which have long-term policies with respect to their neighbors on the continent. It is obviously necessary, to win the war, that this country should establish the closest possible collaboration with its two great Allies. This necessity is bound to influence Washington's decisions on specific issues. But since our decisions, in turn, are bound to have some influence on those of Britain and Russia, it is of the first importance that we should define for ourselves the course of development we would like to see Europe follow during and after the war.

The course which would seem least desirable from the point of view of the United States is the creation in Europe of two spheres of influence—with the countries of Eastern Europe and the Balkans having no choice but to cluster around Russia, and those of Western Europe having no choice but to lean on Britain. Such a trend would perpetuate the state of anarchy that facilitated two world wars. Of course, if the United States should once more, at the end of this war, withdraw into isolation, then a division of Europe into British and Russian spheres of influence, with each of the two great powers undertaking responsibility for the protection of its satellites, might prove the only answer to the problem of security. But assuming that the United States intends to participate in world affairs, a security system for Europe based primarily on the 20-year Anglo-Russian alliance of May 26, 1942 would not offer a constructive program from the American point of view. The Anglo-Russian alliance, the Russo-Czech pact of mutual assistance, and other bilateral or regional arrangements can be useful as bricks in the structure of a world organization. But if no world organization is created, they could all too easily degenerate into the old-fashioned types of arrangements which provoke the suspicions of nations not included in their framework, resulting in counterarrangements and eventual clashes.

A POLICY OF PARTNERSHIP. It is because great-power alliances offer little hope of post-war stability that it seems in the interest of the United States to support a wider combination of nations. Even the most extreme isolationists would be shocked if this country were more or less excluded from Europe. But even the most extreme interventionists would not want the United States to assume the major share of responsibility for stabilization of the continent. The policy toward Europe that would seem to suit both American interests and American

temper is neither isolationism nor imperialism—but rather a policy of partnership with other nations in the common task of reconstruction: a partnership in which the United States would obviously be one of the senior partners—not, as now apparently contemplated, a member of a great-power directorate whose fiat would shape the destinies of smaller, weaker nations.

To achieve such a partnership, two things seem essential. First, the United States must help to strengthen the countries of Europe that can prove a bulwark to the resurgence of Germany. This means that we must neglect no opportunity to render political, as well as economic, aid to the peoples who have resisted Nazi rule, and whose resistance makes Allied victory possible. The more all the nations of Europe participate in post-war reconstruction and security measures, the lighter will be the burden borne by the great powers. It is all the more unfortunate, under the circumstances, that Washington continues to give the impression—intentionally or unintentionally—that it is not enthusiastic about the recovery of France. Our official coolness toward the French Committee of National Liberation is in sharp contrast to the more friendly attitude of the British, who see that they will need a strong France if they are to rebuild the continent—most of all if they should have to rebuild it without our active co-operation. Mr. Churchill has seemed to bow to President Roosevelt's wishes on France—but his policy actually gives the French Committee the feeling that Britain, not the United States, is its friend in the hour of direst need.

SUPPORT OF POPULAR MOVEMENTS. Second, the United States must make it as clear as possible, not only by words but by deeds, that we are genuinely sympathetic to popular movements in Europe which are seeking to advance the welfare of their peoples. There are, of course, many different

traditions, many shades of political opinion to take into consideration. No hard and fast rule can apply to all contingencies. But we must get over the idea that non-action on our part constitutes non-intervention. The very fact that we abstain from action in a given situation is, in itself, a form of intervention—as our policy during the civil war in Spain should have made abundantly clear. Russia has already indicated that it will encourage the formation in the countries of Eastern Europe and the Balkans of "friendly," although not necessarily Communist, governments. Mr. Churchill, in his address of May 24 to the House of Commons, revealed that in countries where Britain has strategic or economic interests it will support the continuance of existing régimes—General Franco in Spain, King George in Greece—although it might defer to the United States on France or to Russia on Yugoslavia. The British Prime Minister, who has frankly declared that ideology is no longer at stake in the war, is following a policy dictated by considerations of expediency.

Does, or must, the United States share Mr. Churchill's views? Or do we have other principles and objectives in mind in Europe? The impression is gaining ground among Europeans that, once the Allies have liberated the conquered countries from Hitler, this country will support restoration of pre-war régimes no matter how undemocratic they might have been. Mr. Hull, in his broadcast of April 9, sought to dispel this impression by outright championship of democratic forces. But it will persist, and gain ascendancy, unless this country blazes the trail beyond the creation of a three-power directorate, where it seems to oscillate between Britain and Russia, toward a world organization where it could more freely exercise the vast powers and influence with which it will emerge from this war.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The second of three articles on United States policy in Europe.)

JAPANESE DRIVES IN CHINA SPUR CHUNGKING-COMMUNIST TALKS

Vice President Wallace's trip to the Far East has come at a moment when military and political conditions in China are in an unusual state of flux, with great possibilities for good and evil. At the same time that Chungking's forces, aided by American training and equipment, are moving toward Burma in the first genuine offensive they have launched in seven years of war, other Chinese troops a thousand miles to the northeast are suffering bitter setbacks, the most serious of which is the loss of Loyang, capital of Honan province. On the one hand the Chinese are seeking to effect a junction with General Stilwell's men in north Burma, so that a land route may be established to supplement the present air route from India to China. On the other, they are faced by a grave threat to a highly strategic region—the great "elbow" of the Yellow River,

west of Loyang—as well as to their communications lines over a wide area. It is still too early to foresee how the results of the Chinese and Japanese offensives will ultimately stack up against each other, but at present the enemy seems to be doing much more damage to our side than we are inflicting on him.

DISCUSSING CHINESE UNITY. On the political front, the possibilities of greater unity between Chungking and the Chinese Communists appear brighter than at any time since large-scale friction developed four years ago. On May 17 Lin Tsu-han, 61-year-old chairman of the Communist-led Border Region Administration in the Northwest, arrived in Chungking for political talks. Previously two Central government representatives had held discussions with Lin in Sian, laying a basis for his visit to the capital. On May 19, one day before the Central

Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, the official political party, opened a six-day session, he was received by the Generalissimo. And on May 24 it was announced that Chiang had instructed the Central representatives to continue their conversations with Lin.

This is not the first time in recent years that the Communists and Chungking have held discussions for a settlement of differences, but today there are certain favorable omens that were absent in the past. For example, on the day of Lin's arrival, a group of Chinese and foreign newspapermen was permitted to leave Chungking for a trip to Communist territory. It appears unlikely that the Central government would breach the walls of its stringent blockade on first-hand information about the Communists if a breakdown of political negotiations was anticipated. Moreover, the correspondents were permitted to take with them a consignment of medical supplies for the guerrilla fighters of the North. This is the first consignment to be allowed through since the summer of 1943.

RESURGENT LIBERALS. Still more encouraging are indications that liberal sentiment is reasserting itself in Free China. Progressive elements, who have been hard-pressed by inflation and reactionary measures of suppression, appear more and more to be offering constructive criticism of internal conditions. On May 21, to cite one instance, five university professors declared that China's desperate financial position is due basically to the fact that wealthy citizens are not bearing their share of the costs of the war. The suggestion was made, among others, that the government levy a forced loan of at least five billion Chinese dollars monthly (perhaps U.S.\$20,000,000) from specified wealthy persons.

UNITY MEANS FIGHTING POWER. In one sense the Kuomintang-Communist parleys are military negotiations which can have a profound effect on China's ability to resist, for there is no doubt that the division between the two parties has weakened the struggle against Japan. In the Sian area, toward which the enemy may drive from his Yellow River front, hundreds of thousands of the country's best trained and equipped troops are still employed in watching the Communists and maintaining a blockade against them. This is why, in an editorial of May 13, written before Lin Tsu-han came to Chungking, the *Ta Kung Pao*, China's leading newspaper, stated: "We earnestly hope that the Sian negotiations will end the strife between brothers and that the eventual agreement will allow the sending of the

Government's troops in Shensi to the front to strike against the enemy."

Nor is this the only military benefit to be gained from political understanding, for the regular forces of the Central government and the mobile and guerrilla troops of the Communists could then coordinate their activities against the enemy, as they did so well in the early years of the war. And the United States air forces in China, as yet unable to reach into the zones that mean most to Japan economically, might be able to establish air bases in Communist territory and lash out at North China and Manchuria. The construction of such fields has been urged by American military men for some time, but for internal political reasons the necessary permission has not been forthcoming from Chungking.

Unquestionably, then, Mr. Wallace's trip occurs under conditions that are both critical and propitious. It is to be hoped that he will not only give China assurances concerning future aid, but also express this country's strong desire for a fully united China, which will come to grips with its economic, military and political problems more effectively than in the recent past. One thing is certain: if China takes the democratic road toward a peaceful adjustment of differences that have caused much uneasiness in the United States, the American people will feel an even greater responsibility than heretofore for relieving their Far Eastern ally at the earliest possible moment.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

The Pacific Is My Beat, by Keith Wheeler. New York, Dutton, 1943. \$3.00

An intensely interesting account of a reporter's war-time assignments in the Pacific, ranging from the Aleutians to the Solomons.

This Is India, by Peter Muir. New York, Doubleday, Doran, 1943. \$2.50

A superficial account of India by an American journalist who had little preparation for what he was to see there.

As We Go Marching, by John T. Flynn. Garden City, Doubleday, Doran, 1944. \$2.00

After sketching rather interestingly the development of Fascism in Germany and Italy, the author turns with asperity to bitter criticism of the present Administration which he sees marching toward Fascism.

The Church and the Liberal Society, by Emmet John Hughes. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1944. \$3.00

Brilliant analysis of the Catholic stand on "Liberalism."

The Netherlands, Bartholomew Landheer, editor. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1943. \$5.00


A group of Dutch authorities present clearly and interestingly a picture of their country in one of the United Nations series, devoted to mutual understanding among the Allies.

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Washington News Letter



CHURCHILL SEEKS POST-WAR FRIEND IN SPAIN

Official quarters here are reported to believe that Francisco Franco will not long survive the war's end as *caudillo* of Spain. Dissatisfaction with his authoritarian régime extends far and deep among his fellow countrymen. The United States and Britain, however, proceed on the understanding that military exigency requires political quiet in Spain—which means Franco's continuation in office—during the war, and that, as long as Franco remains the foremost Spanish official, he is a man for the Allies to reckon with. The diplomatic victory the two governments won in Madrid on May 2, for instance, with the conclusion of the neutrality agreement limiting Spanish wolfram shipments to Germany, could be lost if the Spanish government failed to take decisive steps to prevent wolfram from being smuggled out of the country. The importance of the wolfram question and the possibility that Spain might wreak harm on the Allies explain, in short-term perspective, the kind words Winston Churchill devoted to Spain in his address to the House of Commons on May 24. But his words also have a long-term meaning, both for the United States and for Britain.

ALLIED POLICY ON SPAIN. From the United Nations point of view, the Spanish sections of Churchill's speech aid the current Allied campaign to reduce the value of neutral aid to the enemy. In the main, this campaign is proving a success. While Churchill abandoned hope for Turkish entrance into the war, he pointed out Turkey's helpful action in cutting off chrome shipments to Germany. The State Department is confident that Portugal will soon reduce its shipments of wolfram to Germany, and agreement is looked for with Sweden on the irksome ball-bearing question. Eire alone holds out against concessions to the United Nations.

In emphasizing that war necessity causes the Allies to deal gently with the present Spanish government,

Churchill bespoke the attitude of the Washington Administration, which finds it expedient, in dealing with neutrals, to apologize for Spain but to blast at Sweden, Eire and Turkey. This strategy is due to the division between friends and enemies of the Allied cause within the Spanish government. According to the British, blunt words about Spain would only discourage our friends and strengthen our enemies in that government, which as a whole opposes democratic institutions and tends to sympathize with the German cause rather than our own. The friends in the Spanish government whom the Allies consider it worthwhile to encourage include Foreign Minister Jordana, who argued the Allied cause in the Spanish cabinet during the wolfram negotiations; Air Minister Vigon; and members of the secretariat, who have permitted thousands of refugees to pass through Spain on their way to havens of safety from Nazi tyranny.

Mr. Churchill's references to Spain have created the impression here that further friendly British actions respecting both Spain and Portugal may be expected. The British Foreign Office has detected signs in Madrid and Lisbon that the position of high regard and influence which Britain has enjoyed in those capitals for a century and more is declining, while the stock of the United States is apparently rising. Although the British Prime Minister is not engaging in a race against the United States for favor here and there, he considers it advantageous to build Britain's political strength where he can, especially in Western and Mediterranean Europe.

But whatever encouragement Franco found in Churchill's speech, this is not expected to help him remain in office. Although Churchill's remarks may bring Franco supporters closer to Britain, time will tell whether it carried the rest of the world away from Britain. For whether he meant to or not, Churchill left the impression that he spoke kindly not only of Spain but of Spanish fascism. And two days later Sir Samuel Hoare, British Ambassador to Madrid, strengthened that impression by publicly advocating a foreign policy of "live and let live." Particularly disturbing on the eve of the great military drive for liberation of Europe from the National Socialist form of fascism, this sounded like an echo from the 1930's, when Germany and Italy waxed strong and menacing because Hoare and others were saying then: "live and let live."

BLAIR BOLLES

For a survey of the development of trade and the striking advances in aviation in Africa, as well as the problems they suggest for the future, READ—

COLONIAL PROGRESS IN CENTRAL AFRICA

—Belgian Congo and French Equatorial Africa

by Grant S. McClellan

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